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Short statement: This paper offers a critical engagement with psychoanalysis in which some of 
its ‘unconscious’ assumptions are examined. It aims to clarify how psychoanalysis participates 
in some ‘colonialist’ ideas and to help develop ways of thinking about social violence. 
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Primitivity and Violence: Traces of the 
Unconscious in Psychoanalysis 
Abstract  
 
Psychoanalysis, the theory and practice of the ‘unconscious’, has an unconscious of its own, in 
the sense of containing unacknowledged assumptions that continue to affect it. The unconscious 
of psychoanalysis can be seen in the implicit models that it holds of the nature of the human 
subject, and particularly in the manner in which psychoanalytic ‘knowledge’ is disrupted by 
persistent assumptions and recurrent blind-spots that are at best partially recognised. These 
operate especially strongly in relation to ‘otherness’. 
 
In this paper, some lingering effects of psychoanalysis’ ‘unconscious’ assumptions are explored. 
It is argued in particular that the colonial elements of psychoanalysis’ heritage are visible in its 
conceptualisation of violence and primitivity, and specifically in thinking of violence as an 
‘atavistic’ reproduction of a foundational savagery that, in its imagery and in its substance, is 
caught up with divisions between civilised and barbaric with very particular sociohistorical 
resonances.    
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Primitivity and Violence: Traces of the 
Unconscious in Psychoanalysis 
The Unconscious in/of Psychoanalysis 
 
Psychoanalysis, the theory and practice of the workings of the unconscious, has many 
complexities, some of which can be thought about as if it too has an ‘unconscious’ that affects it. 
This is of course mainly an analogy, an attempt to characterise ways in which psychoanalysis 
operates ‘as if’ it is influenced by factors that are not immediately evident, that have important 
historical sources in the development of the discipline, and that at times are intentionally 
obscured in the sense of not being spoken about, or of being actively excluded from the account 
its practitioners might give of it.  Such ‘unconscious’ processes are evident when psychoanalysis 
is considered as a set of personal and institutional practices, particularly at times of crisis – 
exactly paralleling what happens with individuals, who are more likely to display their 
unresolved unconscious conflicts when under stress. There has been much discussion, for 
example, of how psychoanalytic controversies have revolved around personalities and intense 
emotional investments between analysts and their colleagues and teachers. The debates 
between the two major British psychoanalytic groups, the Freudians and Kleinians, within the 
British Psychoanalytical Society in the early 1940s, systematised as the ‘Controversial 
Discussions’ (King and Steiner, 1991) are the paradigmatic case. Amongst other things, they 
nearly resulted in Anna Freud leaving the Society, and they staged a vicious dispute between 
Melanie Klein and her own daughter, Melitta Schmideberg (Schmideberg resigned from the 
Society in 1944).  Whilst there were genuine differences between the protagonists in their views 
of psychoanalytic discoveries, and much of the debate was framed as a discussion of 
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psychoanalysis’ ‘scientific’ findings, there is little doubt that the British Psychoanalytical Society 
at the time was riven by passionate yet mainly unspoken anxieties linked to the war and the 
daily bombing that was going on around, to the recent death of Freud and the ambivalent 
mourning associated with it, and to the experiences of disruption, exile and loss suffered by the 
newly arrived European analysts. A supposedly ‘civilised’ world was being crushed by brutality, 
and the British Psychoanalytical Society, which might have been expected to be a safe haven, 
found itself reproducing some of that brutality, only just saving itself at the brink of destruction. 
There is also evidence that when faced with political pressure psychoanalytic institutions have 
at times ‘acted out’ in ways that suggest the existence of ‘unconscious’ traces of unresolved 
conflicts. For example, the German Psychoanalytical Society’s attempt to preserve itself in the 
1930s through anti-Jewish collaboration with the Nazi authorities, and then the manner in 
which this was covered up in the post-war period before becoming visible in the 1980s, has 
been the subject of considerable analysis. Some of this suggests the enactment of an 
unacknowledged repudiation of the Jewish origins (and originator) of psychoanalysis followed 
by guilt and shame that barely masks continuing antisemitism (Frosh, 2005; 2012). The point 
here, simply, is that psychoanalytic institutions and psychoanalysts are at least as prone as 
other groups to demonstrate behaviour that vitiates claims of scientific rationality – or 
sometimes simply good sense – and offers evidence that something inexplicably ‘irrational’ is at 
work, even in the heartland of a discipline that trades in insight and enlightenment. 
 
None of this is particularly unexpected. Indeed, in many respects it follows naturally from the 
conditions of emergence of psychoanalysis itself – its rootedness in its particular time and place 
but also in the personality of its founder – and from the characteristics of its central notion or 
‘discovery’, the dynamic unconscious. Freud’s hope that psychoanalysis might be a rational 
scientific enterprise that would contribute to the overcoming of ‘infantilism’ (Freud, 1927, p.48) 
was belied by the many rigidities, intensities and ambiguities in his own personality, ranging 
from superstitions and ‘occult’ beliefs (Frosh, 2013a) to passionate relationships and equally 
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passionate splits. The founding of psychoanalysis in this personality is one of its most important 
characteristics, but also a kind of Achilles heel. The fact that psychoanalysis comes from this 
personal space, that, most obviously, one of its most important originating texts, The 
Interpretation of Dreams (Freud, 1900) consists substantially of interpretations of Freud’s 
dreams, is a remarkable occurrence. What other ‘science’ has as its explicit origin the dream life 
of its founder? This has had vitally important and productive consequences in challenging the 
distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ knowledge and in dramatising the centrality of 
‘irrational’ motivational forces in the supposedly rational processes of scientific reasoning. But 
it also presents obvious difficulties: if psychoanalysis is so ‘personal’, then the personal conflicts 
and blind spots of the people involved in it are likely to emerge in its work. That could hardly be 
otherwise in the clinical and possibly institutional practices of psychoanalysis; but the analogy 
between the personal unconscious and what happens in psychoanalysis itself stretches further, 
to include its theoretical and conceptual development. Ideas are emotionally invested in – not 
just within psychoanalysis – and debate around ‘intellectual’ issues at times becomes secondary 
to interpersonal allegiances and conflicts; moreover, there is evidence that some ideas are 
disturbing enough to produce reactions and resistances that may themselves require 
psychoanalytic explanation. In relation to this, the psychoanalyst Jean Laplanche makes a 
powerful point. He first identifies the revolutionary elements in Freud’s thought as those that 
‘decentre’ the human subject, what he calls the ‘Copernican’ perspective that emphasises how 
human psychic life is forever at the mercy of forces external to the ego and is never sufficient to 
itself. Freud was well aware of this, as in the famous comment that, ‘human megalomania will 
have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the psychological research of the present 
time which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must 
content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind’ (Freud, 
1917, p.285). Laplanche argues that one problem in sustaining the radical newness of 
psychoanalysis, reflected in this particular decentring vision, is how much everything depended 
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on Freud’s capacity to remain stalwart when facing disturbing new discoveries, and to resist 
drifting back into more conservative (‘self-centring’) ways of thinking. 
In psychoanalysis everything, essentially, is produced by a single man – 
simultaneously: the discovery, affirmed at a very early stage, and which is conjointly 
(and for me indissociably) that of the unconscious and that of seduction – and the 
going-astray, the wrong path taken each time there was a return to a theory of self-
centring, or even self-begetting. (Laplanche, 1999, p.60) 
This argument will be described in more detail below; the issue for the moment is simply that 
with psychoanalysis being so personal, and so Freud-centred, then ‘unconscious’ aspects of 
Freud’s own thinking – particularly his ‘resistances’ – become strongly determinant over its 
progress. 
 
The discovery of the unconscious might have been the crucial marker of Freud’s intellectual 
achievement, but he was aware of how it might not be very welcome news for the world around 
him. Freud’s (1923, p.14) classic statement captures something of the reluctance with which the 
existence of the unconscious has to be faced. ‘We have found,’ he writes, ‘that is, we have been 
obliged to assume – that very powerful mental processes or ideas exist ... which can produce all 
the effects in mental life that ordinary ideas do ... though they themselves do not become 
conscious.’ Obliged to assume (‘das heißt annehmen müssen’): we don’t want to do so, it would be 
much nicer to be able to assert the capacity of each person to manage themselves rationally, in 
full awareness of what motivates them and consequently better able to control their actions and 
thoughts. It is indeed, as Freud states elsewhere (though sometimes pessimistically), an aim of 
psychoanalysis to make people and the world more like this (e.g. Freud, 1933). But, there is an 
obligation to face reality: things don’t work like that, there is too much that is incomprehensible 
in the way people act, and too much also that returns to haunt us when we think we have 
wished it away. Freud is presenting the discovery here as something that he has been forced to 
accept despite his own wishes, a characteristic rhetorical move that aims to combat claims that 
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he has invented it out of his own fantasies; but he is also acknowledging how difficult it 
becomes, once one allows the notion of a causal unconscious to have purchase, to hold onto the 
old securities, including those of knowledge itself. 
 
Part of the disturbance created by the unconscious lies in how it produces uncertainty wherever 
one goes. From the point of view of psychoanalytic knowledge, this is especially poignant,  
because psychoanalysis is the discipline that seeks to understand and ‘use’ the unconscious to 
produce knowledge and – we should remind ourselves – to heal.  Yet even those who think they 
can tame the unconscious by theorising or invoking it, in practice have found that it disrupts 
what they do – things fall apart, someone backs down unaccountably, a small flaw destroys the 
leader, revolutionary radicalism somehow turns into conformity. This is, according to Freud, the 
nature of the human condition. As Judith Butler (2005) terms it, there is an area of necessary 
‘opacity’ in each human subject, and this means that knowledge of ourselves and others can 
never be complete, but is always blocked by a space of unknowingness. Indeed, according to 
Butler and in line with the Laplanchian framework that she adopts, preserving this area of 
opacity is essential as a means of avoiding ‘ethical violence’ in the sense of forcing an artificial 
integrity on a subject who has the right not to be fully known. Yet if such opacity is so significant, 
then there will always be something that blocks the achievement of full knowledge of the 
subject.  This means that an unconscious dimension to psychic life makes impossible the 
confident achievement of knowledge of ourselves, and through that of knowledge of others. It is 
also arguable that acceptance of the reality of the unconscious makes all knowledge uncertain, 
because our impaired self-knowledge means we can never quite see the external object clearly. 
Ernest Gellner, for instance, tells the story of the unconscious as a cunning adversary: ‘The 
Unconscious,’ he writes (1985, p.83), ‘is a kind of systematic interference, which hampers full 
and proper contact between the mind and its object, and thereby prevents effective knowledge.’ 
Although the workings of the unconscious can be seen (though sometimes only by others) in 
everything we do, we cannot find the thing itself, the unconscious, because it always hides, it 
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lives nowhere, and it blocks us as we try to know it directly. As a consequence, it can never be 
rooted out; there is no end to the struggle with the unconscious, because whichever way we 
turn to look at it, it has a habit of slipping away again, returning to nip at us when we have lost 
sight of it. Every analysis can be re-analysed, every hard-won truth is bedevilled by doubt; the 
unconscious calls everything into question in an infinite regress. 
 
This is especially true of psychoanalysis for a number of reasons. First, psychoanalytic 
knowledge is generated mostly out of the clinical encounter between psychoanalyst and patient, 
an encounter that turns on its capacity to allow the patient’s unconscious ideas to be expressed 
and to be met by the psychoanalyst’s own thought-processes that are informed by her or his 
own unconscious psychic life. Put more simply but also technically, the ‘transference’ of the 
patient to the analyst, which is the network of unconscious fantasies that enshrouds the 
interactions that take place in the clinical setting, is responded to by the analyst’s 
‘countertransference’. This has been thought about in many different ways. Freud’s (1915) early 
idea is still influential (for instance in the Lacanian school of analysis), that countertransference 
is a problem caused by the analyst’s unresolved unconscious complexes and needs to be 
reduced in order for the analyst to see the patient clearly. For others, notably the British 
Kleinian and object relations schools of psychoanalysis and the contemporary ‘relational’ and 
intersubjective groupings in the USA, countertransference is an instrument of knowledge and 
engagement, through which the unconscious of the analyst may have an effect on that of the 
patient (e.g. Spillius et al, 2011). The result is that the psychoanalytic situation is intensely 
infiltrated by unconscious material, and whilst the explicitness of this means that this material 
is unusually open and available for inspection, it also means that the situation – which as noted 
is the prime setting for the generation of psychoanalysis’ scientific understanding – is an 
especially heightened one, full of the uncertainties that the unconscious brings in its wake. 
Whose problem are we dealing with, the patient’s or the analyst’s; how can we know for sure 
that what is being said is an ‘honest’ account of an experience or one tailored (unconsciously) to 
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appeasing or pleasing or seducing the other?  These are both the ordinary, everyday questions 
posed in any analysis, and necessary but also incorrigible obstacles to knowledge. More broadly, 
psychoanalytic theory itself suggests there might be especial problems with the impact of 
unconscious resistances on psychoanalytic knowledge. That is to say: if, as Freud (1914) 
suggests, advances in psychoanalytic treatment always have to be made in the face of resistance, 
which is produced most forcefully at those moments when the most telling truths are about to 
be revealed, then the discipline which tackles the unconscious is likely to be met by the 
strongest resistance of all – a point that Freud developed in his defence of psychoanalysis 
against criticisms from outside it (Freud, 1925) but which also applies to its inner dynamics, as 
some authors, particularly Laplanche (1999) have argued.  
  .  
One major consequence of the ‘infection’ of psychoanalysis with the unconscious has to do with 
the manner in which psychoanalytic ‘knowledge’ is disrupted by persistent assumptions and 
recurrent blind-spots that are at best partially recognised. In this respect, the argument has 
some resonance with the famous critique of Freud by Laplanche, prefigured above. The echoes 
here are twofold. First, Laplanche notes the reflexivity of psychoanalysis in relation to the 
reciprocal impact of its theory on its subjects: 
Any epistemology or theory of psychoanalysis must take account of the very basic fact 
that the human subject is a theorizing being and a being which theorizes itself, by which 
I mean that it is a self-theorizing being or… a self-symbolizing being. (Laplanche, 1989, 
p.10) 
At its simplest, what is suggested here is that psychoanalysis, as it gained purchase in many (but 
especially European and American) societies, became a resource whereby people started to 
understand themselves in its terms,  producing modes of consciousness that then are 
understood from within psychoanalytic theory in a kind of positive feedback loop. 
Psychoanalysis presents an important set of ideas about human psychology; as these ideas 
become more culturally widespread, people reflect upon themselves in relation to them; 
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psychoanalysis pursues these reflections, both in the clinical setting and in wider cultural 
presentations (film, literature, political rhetoric, etc); and these in turn then demand further 
shifts in theory and practice, and so on. The point here is that psychoanalysis does not merely 
describe the psychology of human subjects; it also has an effect on this psychology – in 
important respects, it produces the ways in which people think about themselves and relate to 
others (it is productive of consciousness). This implies that the ‘unconscious’ assumptions of 
psychoanalysis infect people’s modes of being outside the clinical setting as well as within it. 
 
The second issue concerns Laplanche’s idea that psychoanalysis consistently ‘wanders’ from the 
path of its own radical perceptions. The specifics of this have to do with the centrality of 
seduction in Laplanche’s ‘new foundations’ for psychoanalysis, an idea that is proving 
increasingly powerful in providing psychoanalysis with a non-essentialist and non-biological 
grounding (Fletcher, 2013) and in applications of psychoanalysis ‘outside the clinic’ (Fletcher 
and Ray, 2014).  For the present, however, what matters is Laplanche’s ‘diagnosis’ of why it is 
that psychoanalysis fails to maintain this radical vision –why it seems so frequently to back 
away from what it also somehow knows. The thing it knows, according to Laplanche (1999), is 
the ‘external’ locus of subjecthood, which he understands as having to do with the enigmatic 
message placed in the human infant by the sexual unconscious of the other. For example, it is 
not known to the mother how much her erotic life is pressed into action by her contact with the 
child, but this is nevertheless passed on by her to her infant as an unconscious message, an 
indigestible piece of psychic activity. Unintentionally, unbidden, the adult implants in the infant 
a disturbance that cannot be fully interpreted, but that remains encrypted as the kernel of the 
unconscious. According to Laplanche, this is a seduction, exciting the child in an enlivening way 
but also producing the continuing pressure for interpretation and enlightenment that every 
human subject feels.  It also has important ‘political’ consequences in directing the attention of 
psychoanalysis to what comes into the subject from ‘outside’ and hence to relations with 
otherness (an orientation that is familiar from other contemporary philosophers, and is made 
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explicit by Butler (2005) in relation to Levinas). According to Laplanche, however, this 
‘decentring’ focus is consistently undermined by the tendency of Freud and his followers to ‘re-
centre’, to make the unconscious a solely inner event, available to ego control. 
[From] the moment  that the unconscious is reduced in its alien-ness to what one could 
call, along with theologians and those of a certain faith, an intimor intimo meo 
[‘something more inward than my own inwardness’], we can only observe a return to 
centring: there is something in me which I’ve split off from, denied, but which I must re-
assimilate. Certainly, the ego is not the master of its own house, but it is, after all, at 
home there nonetheless. (Laplanche, 1999, p.67) 
This ‘domestication of the unconscious’ (ibid.) that places the unconscious in the control of the 
subject is always present in Freudian thought, in Laplanche’s view, for a very specific reason: it 
reflects the tendency of the human subject itself to withdraw from insights that are too 
disturbing, in particular from recognition of the essentially alien nature of human subjectivity. 
Laplanche (1999, p.81) expresses this as follows:  
in Freud the theoretician, the going-astray is accompanied by a sort of connivance with 
the object; in other words, a covering-up of the truth inherent in the very object which 
thought confirms. The closing-in-on-itself of the Freudian psychical system… would be 
radically linked to the closing-in-on-itself of the human being in the very process of its 
constitution. 
Or as John Fletcher writes in his introduction to Laplanche’s Essays on Otherness: 
To this dialectic between a decentring to which Freud officially aligns himself and a 
recurrent recentring, Laplanche joins the diagnostic notion of a wandering or going-
astray of Freudian thought. . . . The covering over and occlusion of the discovery of the 
radical otherness of the unconscious and sexuality in Freud’s thought, Laplanche 
suggests, trace out the movements of just such a covering over in the human subject 
itself. (Fletcher, 1999, p.3) 
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Awareness of the extent to which what is other dominates our existence is too painful, too 
terrifying, to be maintained; instead, both the subject and psychoanalysis itself ‘wander’ back 
from the momentary vision of this truth, to the fantasy of completeness, of narcissistic selfhood. 
This is an instance –according to Laplanche the most powerful one – of a general tendency of 
psychoanalytic theory to follow some of the same defensive processes in the face of ‘traumatic’ 
material as the psychoanalytic patient does. More generally still, it can be thought of as a 
description of the process whereby psychoanalytic research uncovers a radical dimension of the 
human subject – here, the striking way in which otherness can become central to the subject’s 
experience of itself – but then, faced with the disturbance produced by its own discoveries, it 
hides its knowledge from itself, with the result that it carries along with it unrecognised but 
nevertheless powerful ‘irrationalities’ that continue to impact upon its theories and practices. 
These irrationalities and resistances have consequences in sustaining assumptions about the 
subject that require, but do not always receive, investigation; and at the heart of many of these 
is an attitude to ‘otherness’ that is retrogressive in the very precise sense articulated by 
Laplanche, ‘a covering-up of the truth inherent in the very object which thought confirms.’    
Violence in the Unconscious of Theory 
 
The view that we are in a psychoanalytically ‘saturated’ world in which psychoanalysis both 
expresses and produces modes of subjectivity that carry ‘repressed’ elements of the 
psychoanalytic unconscious with them, is given some sharpness when we think about 
psychoanalysis as a mechanism whereby discarded elements of the social are smuggled back in. 
Amongst the most potent of these social discards are those that relate to colonialism, which can 
serve here as an example of how psychoanalysis can continue to be plagued by its own 
unconscious assumptions in the sense that its capacity for providing truly critical concepts is 
hindered by unrecognised, defensive ‘goings-astray’, specifically in relation to otherness. In 
summary, psychoanalysis carries with it colonial ideas that are to some degree hidden from 
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sight, yet still influence its concepts and its constructions of the human subject. This does not 
mean that it is straightforwardly colonial or racist; indeed, part of the point is that the 
ambiguities of postcolonial culture are reflected in the ambiguities in psychoanalysis itself, 
which both holds onto some core colonialist tropes whilst also proving useful to the emergence 
of a decolonising consciousness. Anderson, Jenson and Keller, introducing a book on the 
postcolonial uses and critiques of psychoanalysis and ethnopsychiatry, comment on how 
psychoanalysis reflects (and implemented) some central colonial and decolonising impulses:  
From the 1920s, psychoanalysis was a mobile technology of both the late colonial state 
and anti-imperialism. Insights from psychoanalysis shaped European and North 
American ideas about the colonial world, the character and potential of ‘native’ cultures, 
and the anxieties and alienation of displaced white colonizers and sojourners. Moreover, 
intense and intimate engagement with empire came to shape the apparently generic 
psychoanalytic subjectivities that emerged in the twentieth century – whether European 
or non-European.  (Anderson, Jenson and Keller, 2011, p.1-2) 
Whilst there is no space here to trace this dynamic in detail, the argument that psychoanalysis 
both embodies (some) colonialist assumptions and fuels the possibility of revealing and 
critiquing these, is an important one that is also borne out by the use of psychoanalysis by some 
significant postcolonial critics (e.g. Bhabha, 1991; Khanna, 2004). Nevertheless, psychoanalysis’ 
analytic capacity to advance ‘decolonising’ thought is significantly inhibited by its continuing 
adherence to some unspoken colonialist allegiances, especially in respect of its understanding of 
otherness.  This applies particularly clearly in relation to an inveterate association between 
‘primitivity’ and violence. In what follows, this association is explored as a primary instance 
(another one might be the versions of sexuality as ‘impulse’ or uncontrollable ‘drive’ that can be 
found in psychoanalytic theory)of the ‘unconscious’ repetition of patterns of colonialist 
thought.. 
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In thinking about the origins of society, Freud took a position that violence lies at the core of 
social and personal formations.  The killing of the primal father described in the Freudian ‘just-
so story’ of the origins of society in Totem and Taboo (1913) and in the parallel tale of the killing 
of Moses in Moses and Monotheism (1939), shows up as Freud’s attempt to explain the 
inheritance of a destructive element in social relations that derive from the earliest moment of 
species-experience. This is not a ‘symbolic’ statement, though it is often taken to be a 
psychoanalytic myth or metaphor. For Freud, there was a big and urgent question of atavism, of 
what it is that explains the nature of a return that so often seems excessive to the situation – a 
phenomenon that he believed could only be explained through the lens of Lamarckianism, in the 
sense that we are still fighting the battles of the past. We are, in that sense, our ancestors. 
When we study the reactions to early traumas, we are quite often surprised to find that 
they are not strictly limited to what the subject himself has really experienced but 
diverge from it in a way which fits in much better with the model of a phylogenetic event 
and, in general, can only be explained by such an influence. The behaviour of neurotic 
children towards their parents in the Oedipus and castration complex abounds in such 
reactions, which seem unjustified in the individual case and only become intelligible 
phylogenetically – by their connection with the experience of earlier generations. 
(Freud, 1939: 99) 
This can seem like an unexpected argument for Freud to make, in that the practice of 
psychoanalysis involves careful tracing out of the relationship between neurotic children and 
adults and their parents and others, and one usually thinks of this as a process of gaining insight 
into behaviour by reference to the specifics of a person’s biography and fantasy life, not through 
speculations about heritability. Laplanche (1989, p.34), for one, denies that Freud’s appeal to 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics is even Lamarckian, in part because ‘the phylogenetic 
heritage does not consist of characteristics or of improvements to an apparatus, but of scenarios 
which live on in a sort of memory… primal fantasies may flesh out the individual’s memory, and 
they are situated at the level of memory, not the level of function.’ Why does Freud need to 
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appeal to prehistory in order to explain the operations of memory; could he not, as Laplanche 
would advocate, focus instead on the actual experiences of the infant, looking for the 
‘justification’ of the child’s intense responses in the reality of its social and interpersonal 
situation? Yet what Freud does here is not so much pursue what he regards as the inadequacy of 
explanation at the level of the individual’s experience, but rather try to map the personal 
unconscious as full of traces of a founding communal violence that is irresolvable because it is 
repeated in the experiences of each individual. In effect, we have a trauma theory: the whole 
species (or in the case of the Jews in Moses and Monotheism, the people) encounters an 
overwhelming act of violence which marks it forever; we are not aware of this because it is held 
as a kind of unconscious knowledge; but as each of us catches a glimpse of the violence in our 
individual (Oedipal) relationships, so the shadowing enormity of the original violence returns. 
This is a model of traumatic inheritance built on ‘après-coup’ or ‘afterwardsness’, a temporality 
of repetition: something happens, we are never aware of it fully; but as we encounter the 
relatively small echoes of it in everyday life, we find ourselves responding excessively, unaware 
that it is the original formation that is in operation. For Freud at least, what happens takes the 
shape of a murder.  
 
The idea that violence is implicated in the foundation of society is of course not unique to Freud: 
it is also present in a wide range of theories that base their understanding of the social on an 
exclusionary process, one in which some are allowed inside the boundary of the group and 
others are not (Palacios, 2013). In this sense, all social formations are violent in the sense that 
they all differentiate between those who can participate and those who are left outside; and 
these others then form an opposition that might be derogated or might become a threat and 
indeed might inflict actual or symbolic harm on the group. Psychoanalysis adds to this an 
account of how violence operates within the domain of the individual as well as the social: there 
is hardly any version of psychoanalytic theory that does not invoke violence and destructive 
aggression as a major element in the drive towards development. For Kleinians, for example, the 
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intricacies of violence are very pronounced, as the death drive comes into the foreground and 
envy – seen as the pure ‘representative’ of the death drive – is made foundational to the 
functioning and organisation of the mind. ‘I consider that envy is an oral-sadistic and anal-
sadistic expression of destructive impulses,’ writes Klein (1957, p.176), ‘operative from the 
beginning of life, and that it has a constitutional basis.’ But even for Donald Winnicott, often 
seen as on the ‘softer’ side of object relations thinking and now highly influential in American 
‘intersubjectivist’ and relational psychoanalysis as well as in the British tradition, modes of 
aggression and destructiveness are central to development – for example as a way of ‘testing’ 
the resilience of the maternal object in fantasy (Winnicott, 1969). What is at issue here is not the 
detail of one theory over another, but how psychoanalytic thinking about the foundations of the 
mind and hence of human subjectivity places so much emphasis on how violence operates. That 
this vision of the human subject might be accurate is not quite the point, though it has to be said 
that the question of how to survive violence without responding violently is a core one for 
studies of human subjectivity and of ethics (Butler, 2009). What is more relevant here is how 
psychoanalysis drew from its social ‘surroundings’ in making violence so central; and how this 
embedded in it assumptions about otherness and ‘primitivity’ that continue to resonate. 
 
The Freud-Klein comparison around violence is a useful one to briefly pursue here, as these two 
theoretical formations exemplify how psychoanalysis operates in and from particular times and 
places, responding to the concerns of those periods and locations and also giving ‘voice’ to them. 
We can perhaps see in them the revolutionary and the destructive moments of psychoanalysis’ 
inception, first in Freud’s initial work and then in his reformulation of the discipline and the 
emergence of the second generation of analysts immediately after the First World War. Freud 
worked in Europe in a period of revolutions where the dominant locus of excitement and threat 
was the potentially explosive force of ‘repressed’ undercurrents kept at bay by a repressing, 
though increasingly fragile, surface of order that represented ‘traditional’ authority. The model 
of repression and wish that Freud built in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
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precisely echoed this cultural problematic of surface versus depth, of maintaining the dams 
against the pressure of the deep, refracted through images of revolution and the bursting 
through of unconscious, repressed/suppressed desire; and converting passion to social utility 
(‘where id was there ego shall be. It is a work of culture – not unlike the draining of the Zuider 
Zee’ – Freud, 1933, p.80). Everything could be blasted apart by the revolutionary urges from 
beneath; and ambivalence attached to these urges. They were potentially liberating and 
demanded a voice; yet they also carried with them the threat of a barbaric rending of the 
civilisation that had been laboriously constructed. Freud knew this civilisation to be deeply 
flawed – he was, after all, Jewish and shared the experience of the hypocritical promise of 
emancipation (which in Austria occurred only in his own childhood) coupled with continuing, 
escalating antisemitism. Indeed, it is arguable that the movement of psychoanalysis after 1920 
became defined according to the ‘fort-da’ game described in Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(Freud, 1920), the book in which the death drive is introduced. This game was one in which 
Freud’s young grandson made something appear and then disappear, announcing a view of the 
essential nature of psychoanalysis as a practice of repetition.  Metaphorically at least, this was 
true of the whole of European culture in relation to the Jews: you can come in, but then you 
must leave; every advance is temporary and can be rescinded; yours is always a borderline 
experience, always going away again. It also reflects a major claim that psychoanalysis makes, 
that what seems to have disappeared is likely to reassert itself; and what is here is always 
haunted by what has gone. 
 
After the First World War, Freud’s thinking took at least two somewhat different directions in 
regard to the vision of violence that pervades social relations. One continued the theme of 
belligerent revolt versus limitation and constraint, with an emphasis on the prohibitive violence 
upon which law is founded – the violence of the father who sees his son trying to displace him, 
and threatens the son with the full force of his power. Late on in his work, for example, Freud 
notes that the consequence of the ‘opposition’ between the individual and society is an 
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internalisation of violence whereby the superego is formed and the child then becomes 
subjected to its stringency: ‘Civilization ... obtains mastery over the individual’s dangerous 
desire for aggression by disarming it and by setting up an agency within him to watch over it, 
like a garrison in a conquered city’ (Freud, 1930, p.124). So not only does the death drive 
operate as a source of an impulse towards dissolution on the one hand and projected aggression 
on the other; there is also a version of the ‘inner world’ that is constructed on the basis of the 
(phantasised but not unrealistic) appreciation of the hostility and violence of the external 
environment. The child is regulated by violence and responds with aggression turned against 
her or his own impulses. On the other hand, the post-War period staged an obsession with loss 
and death; in Freud this produced the death drive as a realisation of the uncanny (Freud, 1919). 
Ghostliness in Freud’s own thought was matched by a culture-wide investment in seeing ghosts, 
all those dead young men who would never return, but who were sensed at every corner, 
marking and shadowing lives in their restless, unsettled, betrayed way.  
 
In Britain in the 1920s and 1930s, as the losses of the War came to be absorbed, the question of 
deathliness became particularly prominent in society generally, and in literature in particular, 
setting the conditions for the emergence of a Kleinian ‘culture’ in the British psychoanalytical 
scene. Not only was destructive violence theorised under the gradually emerging terms of the 
‘paranoid-schizoid position’, which reached its apogee after the Second World War (Klein, 
1946), but the Kleinian ‘depressive position’ was articulated, and reparation –with all its 
ambivalence – became the model of mental health. This was worked out by Klein through the 
1920s and especially in her seminal 1935 paper, A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-
Depressive States, where reparation has its simplest definition: ‘The ego feels impelled (and I can 
now add, impelled by its identification with the good object) to make restitution for all the 
sadistic attacks that it has launched on that object’ (p. 149). Here one key moral question was 
central: how do we make good what we have destroyed? In this regard, the very specific 
resonance of some Kleinian ideas in the wake of the First World War and their increasing 
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influence after the Second does not attest to their truth value so much as to their cultural 
congruence. Reparation rebuilds the world after destruction; yet, it is only in its social context 
that one can get the full feel of the ambiguities involved. Lyndsey Stonebridge notes that in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, ‘reparations’ not only meant repairing the damage done, but – 
because of the disastrous failure of political imagination accompanying the Versailles Treaty – it 
also had connotations of being unfair and unduly punitive, hence continuing in the destructive 
mode. ‘Like redemption,’ she writes (Stonebridge, 1998, p.32), ‘reparation carries with it both 
the spiritual sense of salvation and atonement and economic connotations of compensation and 
dues collected…  For vocal if not ultimately influential sections of the European intelligentsia as 
well as for those suffering under the terms of the treaty, reparation came to mean something 
exorbitant, excessive and punitive, in short, an invitation to more aggression.’ What is 
highlighted here is the ambivalence entailed in ‘making good’ the destruction of the war in an 
environment in which nothing had been worked through or resolved, and in which the 
dynamics of anxiety and hatred had not been owned or understood. It is not so much that the 
Kleinian notion of reparation offers a key to understanding the culture of the time, though it 
does give some useful leverage for exploring its nuances. It is rather that the trope of reparation 
runs through a range of cultural products, including Kleinian psychoanalysis, giving them 
resonance and appeal, and filling them with the meaning-effects that make them warrantable at 
that time and place. This was different from the Freudian era: the ‘problem’ was no longer how 
to live with uncontainable desire, whether sexual or aggressive; it was rather how to manage a 
situation in which violence and destructiveness were irrevocable, and had already taken place. 
In this context, the notorious Kleinian focus on destructiveness is actually ‘positive’ in its 
orientation (Rustin, 1995), in that it takes as given the human propensity for violence and tries 
to develop a language and practice through which it can be alleviated. But the broader point is 
also a simpler one: whether exemplified in the European context of its earliest formulation as a 
practice of control over unconscious wishes, or in the later twentieth-century interest in 
reparative and sustainable relationships, psychoanalysis is infected with the problematics of its 
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period; and what its subjects and its originators went through cast long shadows of violence and 
loss. 
Primitive Remains 
 
To return to the main argument, there is something else to consider in relation to 
psychoanalysis, understood as a theory that is infected by violence, yet positions itself as an 
approach of enlightenment. This concerns how the theorising of violence is underpinned by 
certain assumptions that ‘unconsciously’ reproduce the terms of a colonial imagination. For 
Freud, psychoanalysis was an emancipatory practice that would bring illumination and reveal 
the infantilism at the source of so much individual and social behaviour; this revelation would 
be a way of taming the unconscious and using its energy in the pursuit of a more creative, more 
‘civilised’ world. This has barely happened, of course, and in Freud’s lifetime it became clear that 
the European world was slipping into barbarism – with Freud himself associated with the 
victims. The traces of this in psychoanalytic theory are very pronounced, and none of it should 
really have been a surprise. Indeed, they are theorised explicitly in Civilisation and its 
Discontents (Freud, 1930): society is hypocritical, the unconscious is at loggerheads with it; 
there is little likelihood of dramatic change; violence is the source and origin of the social; death 
comes to dominate us all. If barbarism breaks down the ‘garrison’ of civilisation, it can hardly 
come as a shock to those who devote their intellectual and professional energy to tracing the 
impossibility of coming to terms with the unconscious. But let us go a little further too, in 
thinking through Freud’s and psychoanalysis’ positioning of the space of violence and savagery. 
For this word – ‘savage’ – is quite a key one in the formation of psychoanalysis.  
 
Freud’s (1913) adoption of a binary differentiation between ‘savage’ and ‘primitive’ on the one 
side, and ‘civilised’ on the other, has been discussed extensively in many places, as has the way 
in which this ‘colonial’ discourse is disrupted by the Freudian assertion of the presence of 
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‘primitivity’ within every subject, however ostensibly ‘civilised’ they may be, in the form of an 
unconscious that does not obey the dictates of rationality (e.g. Frosh, 2013b). The issue here is 
the way in which this imagery of savagery and primitivism is reproduced in accounts of 
violence, with the effect of running together the ideas of the primitive ‘other’ of colonialism and 
the violent elements in all human subjects. That is to say, where destructiveness is observed, it 
is commonly interpreted as a reflection of ‘primitive’ elements of the subject, and accretes 
around it associations and fantasies of the ‘uncivilised’ other, to which the colonial mentality is 
well attuned. Thus, the opposition between ‘civilisation’ and ‘the individual’s dangerous desire 
for aggression’ holds in the example given earlier (Freud, 1930, p.124), as does the notion of the 
death drive as something that returns as a primordial situation, associated with primitive 
fantasies about dissolution. Hence Freud’s (1919, pp.241-2) gloss on death: ‘Since almost all of 
us still think as savages do on this topic, it is no matter for surprise that the primitive fear of the 
dead is still so strong within us and always ready to come to the surface on any provocation.’ 
This ‘regressive’ framework, assuming a kind of ‘descent’ into savagery, is present too in the 
Kleinian fascination with destructiveness, which is made consequent upon an inbuilt death 
drive that produces envy as a ‘primitive’ affect linked with attacks on the maternal object. 
(Notably, Klein uses the notion of ‘primitive’ freely to describe early, passionate affects and 
desires; but she also uses it in the same way as does Freud, as in opposition to ‘civilised’. For 
example: ‘Another question applies to the effect of late weaning, as is customary with primitive 
peoples and also in certain sections of civilized communities’ – Klein, 1952, p. 119.) The 
‘positive’ move in Kleinian theory through the depressive position and into reparation retains a 
sense of needing to overcome impulsivity through managing more complex (one might call 
them ‘civilised’) thought patterns that tolerate uncertainty and ambivalence in a way assumed 
to be difficult for children to manage. Under the conditions that prevailed in these great 
moments of formation of seminal psychoanalytic theories – and that still exert significant 
influence today – the idea of ‘primitive’ thinking and emotion slips easily into the figure of the 
‘primitive’, who by virtue of precisely this ‘primitivity’ (irrationality, impulsivity, etc) becomes 
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other to the civilised. Only certain colonised individuals – ‘elite natives’ with complex and 
conflicted psyches that could be subjected to psychoanalysis (Andersen et al, 2011) – are 
potential citizens; the others are infantilised in their childlike consciousness, justifying 
European dominance in everyone’s interests.  
 
There are many ways to defend psychoanalysis against the charge of simple colonialism, and as 
mentioned above these are supported by the adoption of psychoanalysis by many postcolonial 
thinkers (Khanna, 2004; 2011; Frosh, 2013b). Nevertheless, something disturbing recurs here. 
Andersen, Jenson and Keller (2011), whose edited book is an eloquent testimony to ways in 
which psychoanalysis has been used as part of the decolonising movement, also point out how it 
sustains an understanding of ‘primitivity’ that faces both ways – it carries forward what is 
effectively a racist account of the colonised but also shows that the genuine ‘heart of darkness’ 
lies on the side of the coloniser. Tracing the complex manner in which this happens, Andersen et 
al note how psychoanalysis expresses some of the patterns of post-World War One 
destructiveness in terms familiar from colonialism. 
If a central project of psychoanalysis was to demonstrate the universality of its central 
tenets, then finding vestigial traces of such ‘primitive’ characteristics as the incest taboo, 
filial ambivalence, fetishism, and the tension between the indulgence and repression of 
the drives in modern Westerners provided an explanatory logic for the evolution of the 
‘family of man’. The irruption of savagery among the civilized was less pathology than it 
was atavism… Psychoanalysis, as practiced and elaborated in colonial settings and, 
particularly, as adopted and adapted in the emergent postcolony, became reconfigured 
as a powerful critique of colonialism. (Andersen et al, 2011, p.11) 
However, it only seems to do this by carrying forward the previous vision of otherness in terms 
of the primitive and savage – which has to do with the norms of a colonial society in which black 
and brown others were seen as undeveloped and infantile. In an associated way the 
unconscious was understood as passionate, wishful, uncontained and immature; and violence as 
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a form of ‘atavism’ was linked with primitive remains. Whilst other psychoanalytic schools not 
discussed here (for example, intersubjectivists and possibly Lacanians) show less dependence 
on the primitive-civilised binary, the point is that psychoanalysis carries over the traces of this 
binary as it moves forward into the postcolonial era. ‘Unconsciously’, it reproduces them even 
when used in the decolonising movement – this being part of the ambiguity of Fanon’s (1952) 
account and perhaps also why every postcolonial psychoanalyst seems to be drawn back to him 
as a point of origin and fascination. In relation to the spread of psychoanalysis beyond its 
original European and North American heartlands, the continuing pull of colonial assumptions 
can also be found. For example, in one of the most densely psychoanalytic cultures in the world, 
Brazil, there is a clear history of psychoanalysis as a ‘civilising’ force that reinforces colonialism 
as well as providing tools for resistance – in much the way that Andersen et al (2011) describe 
in the quotation immediately above. Early Brazilian psychoanalysis was embedded in a vision of 
nation-building that tackled questions of racial mix and sexuality as primary concerns of a 
society emerging from slavery and supposed ‘primitivism’ (Russo, 2012a). This early history of 
Brazilian psychoanalysis was reshaped through encounters with authoritarianism and social 
control during the twentieth century, resulting in a set of theoretical and practical concerns that 
were characteristically split between a conservative, ‘conforming’ psychoanalysis tied to 
normalising visions of ‘race’ and sexuality (that is, psychoanalysis as a tool for social control) 
and a more critical psychoanalysis offering support for resistance to authoritarian dictatorship. 
One consequence was a tension that arose during the Brazilian dictatorship of 1964-1985 
between the official institutions of psychoanalysis and much of its clientele. Russo (2012b, p. 
174), for example, noting the contrast between the psychoanalytic promise of individual 
‘liberation’ and the conformism of the psychoanalytic societies, comments ‘The silence or even 
the connivance of the “official” societies with regard to the military dictatorship was a hallmark 
of psychoanalysis in Brazil… “official” psychoanalysis … became a symbol of political 
conservatism at a time when psychoanalysis — at its height — was regarded as an instrument 
of liberation by a good number of its clients.’ Similar tensions occurred in Argentina (Plotkin, 
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2012), although the specific history there showed different colonialist dynamics, as 
psychoanalysis was deployed to reinforce the idea of a ‘European’ dominant class.  
Conclusion 
 
The idea that psychoanalysis has its own ‘unconscious’ is no more and no less metaphorical than 
the idea that any individual person has an unconscious. We cannot see this thing, the 
unconscious, in any way; we know, in fact, that it does not actually exist as a physical entity.  
Instead, it is evident from what people say and do, in their guarded as well as their unguarded 
moments, that stuff happens, it seeps through and the process of understanding it is always 
retrospective. The claim here is that we can see such ‘seeping through’ in the theory of 
psychoanalysis, and no doubt elsewhere too (for example, in institutional practices and clinical 
work) if we take the time to look for it. This seeping through takes a number of forms, but the 
one emphasised here is the link psychoanalysis makes between violence and primitivity, a link 
that has its origins in Freud’s thought and in the social forces of his day, but is reproduced in 
later psychoanalysis and continues to freight contemporary discussions.  
 
I suggested at the start of this piece that whilst unconscious forces operate in all disciplinary 
formations, psychoanalysis’ attempt to articulate and control them might particularly provoke 
them into action. Freud’s apparent reluctance to acknowledge the unconscious (‘we have been 
obliged…’), whether rhetorical or real, might entail a recognition of how the ‘theory of the 
unconscious’ is a provocation. Psychoanalysis presents itself as a discipline of tentative mastery, 
but what is evident is that it has its own blind spots. Other work (feminist and queer) has shown 
how these include gender and sexuality, two dimensions that are absolutely central to 
psychoanalytic thought and yet have also proved to be hothouses for contestation. In this paper 
I have concentrated on another such blind spot, that of colonialism. Directly and indirectly it 
keeps looming into sight. I have argued that the colonial elements of psychoanalysis’ heritage 
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are visible in its conceptualisation of violence, and specifically in thinking of violence as an 
‘atavistic’ reproduction of a foundational savagery that, in its imagery and in its substance, is 
caught up with divisions between civilised and barbaric with very particular sociohistorical 
resonances. I have also tried to hold close to the idea that psychoanalysis can offer ways of 
thinking about violence that can aid the postcolonial project, which I take to be an emancipatory 
one. Specifically, the resistance shown in psychoanalysis to what Laplanche (1999) refers to as 
the ‘Copernican’ vision of the subject as necessarily permeated by the other is a resistance that 
can be analysed and understood – as he tries to do – in relation to the disruption the other 
causes to the ego’s search for control. Building a psychoanalysis that is alert to the functions of 
otherness is not only a clinical task, reflected in contemporary work across a variety of 
psychoanalytic ‘schools’ that emphasise relationality and intersubjectivity (e.g. Benjamin, 
2004); it is also a social and political task. It asks questions of psychoanalysis about how its 
original assumptions about the ‘primitive’ other are maintained in its ongoing conceptualisation 
of the human subject; it particularly focuses attention on what these assumptions produce in 
relation to how violence is understood; and it suggests ways in which these ‘unconscious’ 
assumptions might be unpicked to enable psychoanalysis to offer more cogent accounts of 
violence in society. 
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